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The William B. Lockhart Lecture*
The Hughes Court and the Beginning
of the End of the "Separate But
Equal" Doctrine
A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr.**and
William C. Smith***/****
A century ago, the distinguished abolitionist, statesman and
former slave, Frederick Douglass, pondered whether blacks
would ever be full and equal participants in the American
dream. He asked:
[Can] American justice, American liberty, American civilization,
American law, and American Christianity ... be made to include and
protect alike and forever all American citizens in the rights which
have been guaranteed to them by the organic and fundamental laws
of the land?1
* This Essay is an expanded and annotated version of the William B.
Lockhart Lecture Judge Higginbotham delivered at the University of
Minnesota Law School on November 28, 1990. The Lockhart Lecture Series
honors former University of Minnesota Law School Dean William B.
Lockhart.
** Chief Judge Emeritus, United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit. Senior Fellow, University of Pennsylvania Law School. B.A. Antioch
College, 1949; LL.B. Yale University Law School, 1952. Judge Higginbotham
wishes to acknowledge the generous support of his continuing research on race
and the legal process by the Rockefeller Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the
Potamkin Foundation, the Mellon Foundation, and the William Penn
Foundation.
*** Assistant Regional Counsel, United States Environmental Protection
Agency-Region III. Law Clerk to Chief Judge Higginbotham, 1989-91. B.A.
University of Michigan, 1982; J.D. New York University School of Law, 1986.
This Article was co-authored by Mr. Smith in his private capacity. No of-
ficial support or endorsement by the EPA or any other agency of the federal
government is intended or should be inferred.
**** The authors are grateful to Jolie R. Epstein, Jorge Juantorena, George
Wasilenko, Jr., Brenda R. Landau, Elliott Dawes and Kirby Fowler of New
York University Law School, Holly Hill of Northeastern Law School, and
Brian Levin of Stanford Law School, who provided important research
assistance.
1. RAYFORD W. LOGAN, THE BETRAYAL OF THE NEGRO 9-10 (1965) (em-
phasis in original) (quoting Frederick Douglass).
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Five years later, in Plessy v. Ferguson,2 the Supreme Court
dashed any lingering hope that American blacks would soon re-
alize the constitutional promise of equal rights under the law.
The Plessy Court upheld a state's right to require separate rail-
way coaches for blacks and whites.3 In so doing, the Court cre-
ated a precedent which was extended to support state-imposed
racial segregation in schools and other public facilities.
In his eloquent and prophetic dissent, Justice John M.
Harlan stated:
[I]n view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this
country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no
caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor
tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens
are equal before the law .... It is, therefore, to be regretted that this
high tribunal, the final expositor of the fundamental law of the land,
has reached the conclusion that it is competent for a state to regulate
the enjoyment by citizens of their civil rights solely upon the basis of
race.
4
Harlan concluded: "The destinies of the two races, in this coun-
try, are indissolubly linked together, and the interests of both
require that the common government of all shall not permit
the seeds of race hate to be planted under the sanction of law."'5
In the following decades, the seeds of race hate planted by
the Plessy Court yielded a bitter harvest of divisiveness, racial
degradation, and judicial disrespect for the constitutional guar-
antee of equal treatment under the law.6
2. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
3. Id at 550-51.
4. Id at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
5. Id at 560.
6. For background on issues of racism and the law, see generally DER-
RICK A. BELL, JR., AND WE ARE NOT SAvED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL
JUSTICE (1987); DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAw (2d
ed. 1980) [hereinafter BELL, RACE LAW]; MARY F. BERRY, BLACK RESISTANCE,
WHITE LAw (1971); MARY F. BERRY & JOHN W. BLASsINGAME, LONG MEMORY:
THE BLACK EXPERIENCE IN AMERICA (1982); A COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS
AND AMERICAN SOCIETY (Gerald D. Jaynes & Robin W. Williams, Jr., eds.,
1989); JOHN H. FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. Moss, JR., FROM SLAERY TO FREE-
DOM: A HISTORY OF NEGRO AMERICANS (6th ed. 1988); JACK GREENBERG,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON JUDICIAL PROCESS AND SOCIAL CHANGE: CONSTITU-
TIONAL LITIGATION 1-237 (1977); JACK GREENBERG, RACE RELATIONS AND
AMERICAN LAw (1959); A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTrER OF
COLOR (1978); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1975); GENNA R. MCNEIL,
GROUNDWORK: CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS (1983); LOREN MILLER, THE PETITIONERS: THE STORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE NEGRO (1966); GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN
AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY (20th
anniversary ed. 1962); CARTER G. WOODSON & CHARLES H. WELSEY, THE NE-
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On February 13, 1930, when Charles Evans Hughes became
chief justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, any im-
partial observer would have been compelled to ask the same
question that haunted Douglass in 1891. Because of the Court's
failure to vindicate their legal rights, black Americans were
barred from southern voting booths, relegated to inferior public
schools and facilities, excluded from many state colleges and
universities, and subjected to a hostile criminal justice system.
Americans rightly view the Warren Court's 1954 decision
in Brown v. Board of Education7 as the most critical turning
point in the legal battle against racial segregation. However,
Brown was not a revolutionary decision, but an evolutionary
event. It was the culmination of decades of litigation that
chipped away at the legal foundation of the "separate but
equal" jurisprudence of Plessy and its progeny.
This Article examines the civil rights record of the
Supreme Court under Charles Evans Hughes, who served as
Chief Justice from 1930 to 1941. The Hughes Court is perhaps
best remembered for its decisions in the early 1930s that over-
turned many of the key statutes of President Roosevelt's New
Deal. Students of the Supreme Court often ignore the fact that
it was during the Hughes era that courageous civil rights law-
yers, working in isolation or under the auspices of organizations
such as the NAACP, confronted the Supreme Court with cases
challenging racism in the courts and the electoral process, as
well as challenging racial segregation in public schools, facili-
ties, and transportation. The Court's decisions in these cases
present a mixed record of progress. In a number of critical
cases, the Court stopped far short of guaranteeing blacks the
full enjoyment of "rights which have been guaranteed to them
by the organic and fundamental laws of the land." However,
the seminal civil rights decisions of this era redressed some of
the most egregious instances of state-sponsored racism. In so
doing, the Court took its first tentative steps away from Plessy
and toward Brown.
GRO IN OUR ISTORy (12th ed. 1972); C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CA-
REER OF JIM CROW (3d rev. ed. 1974); Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham, Beyond
the Sound of Silence: Afro-American Women's History, I GENDER & HIST. 50
(1989); Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham, In Politics to Stay: Black Women Lead-
ers and Party Politics in the 1920's, in L. TILLEY & P. GURIN, WOMEN, CHANGE
AND PoLITIcs (1989); Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham, African-American Wo-
men's History and the Metalanguage of Race, SIGNS, Winter 1992.
7. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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I. CIVIL RIGHTS FOR BLACKS IN THE 1930s: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL DREAM OF EQUALITY AND
THE DAILY REALITY OF
DEGRADATION
Two examples suffice to demonstrate the wide gap that ex-
isted during the Hughes Court era between the constitutional
promise of equal treatment under the law and the daily reality
of racial discrimination faced by even the most influential and
powerful blacks.
A. SEGREGATION AND THE CONGRESSMAN: "IT DIDN'T MAKE A
DAMN BIT OF DIFFERENCE WHO I WAS."
The first incident involved the highest ranking black public
official in the United States-Arthur W. Mitchell of Chicago,
the sole black member of the United States House of Repre-
sentatives. On April 20, 1937, Congressman Mitchell boarded a
Pullman car in Chicago with a first class ticket to Hot Springs,
Arkansas. When the train left Memphis, the conductor told
him that he could no longer ride in the first class section.
Later, Mitchell testified, "I thought it might do some good for
me to tell him who I was. I said, 'I am Mr. Mitchell, serving in
the Congress of the United States.' He said it didn't make a
damn bit of difference who I was, that as long as I was a nigger
I couldn't ride in that car."'8 The conductor then warned Mitch-
ell that he had "better get out of that car, and had better be
gone when he came back."9
The conductor's unmuted order forced Mitchell to decide
whether he should retreat to the decrepit black coach, which
had no running water or working toilet, or whether he should
challenge the conductor's policy by refusing to move.
Mitchell testified:
[Flor a moment I decided that I wouldn't go, that I would let them
put me in jail down there and see how the thing would finally come
out.
But I happened to think that I was in Arkansas, and sometimes
they don't keep them in jail for trial down there, but they take them
out and lynch them after they put them in jail; so I thought maybe I
had better not; being the only negro in Congress, that I had better not
8. Record from the United States Supreme Court at 79, Mitchell v.
United States Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 313 U.S. 80 (1941) (No. 577) (re-
printing the testimony of Arthur W. Mitchell before the Interstate Commerce





be lynched on that trip.1 0
The conductor's behavior was in clear violation of a 1914
Supreme Court ruling that the denial of first class accommoda-
tions on trains to blacks violated the Fourteenth Amendment."1
In 1937, however, Mitchell knew that even a black Congress-
man ran the risk of being lynched in Arkansas for demanding
his well-established legal rights.
In 1941, the Supreme Court declared that the railroad's
treatment of Mitchell violated his rights under the Interstate
Commerce Act.-2 Because of further litigation after the
Supreme Court's remand, however, Mitchell did not settle with
the railroad until late 1945.13 Despite the humiliation he had
endured, and the time and expense of litigating his case before
an administrative agency and the state and federal courts,
Mitchell received in settlement the sum of $1,250, which he
split with his attorney.14
B. RACE DISCRIMINATION AT THE CITADEL OF JUSTICE
The second example of racial discrimination in the 1930s
occurred at the citadel of justice in this country, the United
States Supreme Court. Although it is difficult to document the
Court's discriminatory practices, the senior author has heard
10. Id.
11. McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 235 U.S. 151, 161-62 (1914) (stating
that "if he [the black traveller] is denied by a common carrier.., a facility or
convenience in the course of his journey which under substantially the same
circumstances is furnished to another traveler, he may properly complain that
his constitutional privilege has been invaded").
12. Mitchell v. United States Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 313 U.S. 80,
97 (1941). The Mitchell Court concluded that "the discrimination shown was
palpably unjust and forbidden by the Act." Id.
Since its adoption in 1887, the Interstate Commerce Act has prohibited un-
reasonable discrimination by common carriers. Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, § 3,
42 Stat. 379, 380 (current version codified at 49 U.S.C. § 10731(b) (1988)). As
originally enacted, the Act made it unlawful for interstate carriers "to subject
any.., person... to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in
any respect whatsoever." Id Long before Mitchell, the Interstate Commerce
Commission recognized that this language prohibited discrimination between
white and black passengers. See, e.g., Edwards v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry., 12
I.C.C. 247, 249 (1907) (holding that the failure to provide black first-class ticket
passengers with equal facilities violated § 3); Heard v. Georgia R.R., 1 I.C.C.
428, 435 (1888) (same); Councill v. Western & Atl. R.R., 1 I.C.C. 339, 347 (1887)
(holding that the forcible removal of a black passenger from a first-class com-
partment violated § 3 since the passenger had paid first-class fare).
13. See Stipulation for Dismissal and Order, Mitchell v. Lowden, No. 37-C-
5529 (Cook County Cir. Ct. Nov. 5, 1945).
14. See CATHERINE A. BARNES, JOURNEY FROM JIM CROW: THE DESEGRE-
GATION OF SouTHERN TRANSIT 215 n.26 (1983).
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from reputable black lawyers who practiced in the 1930s that
blacks were occasionally discriminated against in the Supreme
Court's cafeteria.
Recently, Judge Lois Forer, a respected Philadelphia jurist,
stated that, as a young lawyer in Washington in the late 1930s,
she often used the Supreme Court library for her research.'5
On one occasion, while standing in line at the Supreme Court's
cafeteria, she stood next to a black lawyer who had an argu-
ment scheduled before the Court. A manager came over to the
lawyer and told him he could not be served. An observer, who
Judge Forer believes was a law clerk, rushed out of the cafete-
ria and returned with Justice Louis Brandeis. The Justice ap-
proached the manager and said, "If this man is not served, I
will leave the Supreme Court." After this unexpected inter-
vention, the cafeteria manager seated the black lawyer at a ta-
ble in the corner, and placed a screen around him.16
In July of 1990, the senior author discussed the history of
segregation at the Court cafeteria with Justice Thurgood Mar-
shall. Justice Marshall reported that he had been told that in
the late 1930s, when Thomas E. Waggaman was marshal of the
Court, a number of incidents demonstrated that Waggaman had
only contempt for blacks.17 According to what Justice Marshall
had been told, Waggaman was so concerned that blacks were
using the Supreme Court cafeteria that he complained to Chief
Justice Hughes. Hughes instructed Waggaman to go outside
the building and look at the portals of the Supreme Court,
which are emblazoned with the words, "Equal Justice Under
Law." The Chief Justice added that if after reading these
words, Waggaman did not understand what the policy of the
Supreme Court should be, he would be replaced. From that
date onward, there reportedly were no further attempts made
to exclude blacks from the Court's cafeteria.:'
15. Interview with the Honorable Lois G. Forer, Retired Judge of the
Court of Common Pleas, in Philadelphia, Pa. (July 23, 1991).
16. Id.
17. Telephone conversation with Justice Thurgood Marshall, United
States Supreme Court (July 13, 1990).
18. There continued to be incidents in the 1930s and 1940s that showed
that the Supreme Court justices were susceptible to the prejudices of their
times. Hugo Black's biographer noted that before the Court's historic 1954 de-
cision in Brown, the issue of racial segregation
had been cropping up in the court's own institutional life in one way
or another over the past decade and a half. In 1939, because of segre-
gated seating arrangements, what was to have been a private recital of
Marian Anderson in Constitution Hall became a public concert at the
1104 [Vol. 76:1099
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The Mitchell case and the segregation at the Supreme
Court exemplify two realities facing blacks in 1930s America:
first, the grudging recognition by the courts that blacks were
entitled to the most basic rights of citizenship; and, second, the
wearying legal battles that blacks were forced to fight to secure
those fundamental rights.
II. "THE PREJUDICES WHICH JUDGES SHARE WITH
THEIR FELLOW MEN": POLITICS, RACE, AND
THE HUGHES COURT'S VIEWS ON
CIVIL RIGHTS
The Supreme Court proclaims to be a non-political institu-
tion, and most justices strive to be objective, dispassionate and
"neutral" in their decision making. However, Justice Holmes's
oft-quoted observation about the "unconscious" prejudices of
judges applies with particular force to the Supreme Court's
civil rights jurisprudence.
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.
The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political the-
ories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the
prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good
deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which
men should be governed.' 9
Indisputably, political and sociological developments in this
country and throughout the world profoundly influenced the
Hughes Court's civil rights decisions. In the first third of this
century, several factors combined to undermine the post-Re-
construction philosophy of white supremacy underlying the
Plessy doctrine. Millions of blacks had fled the stifling poverty
and racial oppression of the Deep South to seek better lives in
northern and midwestern cities. As they gained economic and
political power, these urban pioneers became increasingly stri-
dent in their opposition to discrimination and state-imposed ra-
cial segregation. Blacks and some whites were struck by the
Lincoln Memorial wherein invitations to the Supreme Court pro-
duced one acceptance. In 1947, a household controversy-whether the
black Supreme Court messengers should attend the law clerks' and
secretaries' Christmas party-took almost an hour's debate at the
weekly judicial conference before being settled by an affirmative 6-2
vote.
GERALD T. DUNNE, HuGo BLACK AND THE JuDIciAL REVOLUTION 304 (1976)
(emphasis added). It is interesting to note that no Supreme Court justice had
ever selected a black person as a law clerk until the 1948 Term, when William
T. Coleman, Jr. clerked for Felix Frankfurter. I&i at 287.
19. OLuvER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 1 (1881) (emphasis added).
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hypocrisy of America's self-proclaimed international mission in
World War I to "make the world safe for democracy" while
American blacks were denied the most basic rights of citizen-
ship at home. Finally, after decades of experience with the
"separate but equal" doctrine, no reasonable American could
any longer deny that the disproportionate allocation of re-
sources in the separate schools, separate public accommoda-
tions, and separate public transport for blacks was vastly and
unmistakably unequal.20
The "prejudices which judges share with their fellow men"
affected how the members of the Hughes Court viewed these
developments and shaped their vision of the Court's role in re-
dressing human rights abuses of blacks. The wide divergence of
racial views among the justices is perhaps best illustrated by
comparing the judicial careers of two jurists. One man
emerged as one of the Court's fairly consistent supporters of ra-
cial justice. The other remained trapped by the bigotry and
petty pretenses of his upbringing and became an increasingly
lonely and bitter dissenter as the Court turned away from
Plessy to emphasize equality of treatment as a higher value
than racial segregation.
A. THE GULF BETWEEN TWO JUSTICES
1. Charles Evans Hughes
In an era when most judges shared, or at least implicitly
accepted, the white supremacist principles at the foundation of
Jim Crow legislation, Chief Justice Hughes held relatively pro-
gressive racial views. After Hughes' death, John Lord O'Brian
recalled:
Racial problems were always a matter of serious private concern to
20. Professor Bell described the gross disparity of public education in the
South before Brown:
In 1915, South Carolina was spending an average of $23.76 on the edu-
cation of each white child and $2.91 on that of each black child. As
late as 1931, six Southern states (Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Geor-
gia, and North and South Carolina) spent less than one third as much
for black children as for whites, and ten years later this figure had
risen to only 44 percent. At the time of the 1954 decision in Brown v.
Board of Education, the South as a whole was spending on the aver-
age $165 a year for a white pupil, and $115 for a black.
DERRICK A. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERicAN LAw 452 (1973) (citations
omitted).
For a penetrating analysis of the inequality of segregated public education
in one of the supposedly enlightened border states before Brown, see Parker v.
University of Delaware, 75 A.2d 225, 230 (Del. Ch. 1950).
1106 [Vol. 76:1099
1992] THE HUGHES COURT 1107
him and remained so even in the final years following his retirement
from public life .... As early as 1908, he declared that "with respect
to white and black, conditions which promote the wholesome feeling
of personal honor and individual worth are alone the conditions
which will secure lasting benefits for our society and the solution of
the grave problems which confront it."21
The son of an abolitionist minister, Hughes served two
terms as a progressive, reform-minded governor of New York
before his appointment to the Supreme Court in 1910. He re-
signed from the Court in 1916 to mount an unsuccessful presi-
dential campaign against Woodrow Wilson. From 1920 to 1925,
Hughes served as secretary of state under President Harding.
In 1930, President Hoover appointed Hughes as chief justice of
the Supreme Court, where he served until his retirement in
1941.
In two opinions, written in his first years on the Court,
Hughes demonstrated his practice of redressing specific civil
rights violations, without emphasizing the pervasive racism that
gave rise to the abuses. In Bailey v. Alabama,22 Hughes's ma-
jority opinion reversed, on Thirteenth Amendment grounds,
the conviction of a black laborer found guilty of breaking a one-
year employment contract.23 Despite clear evidence that the
Alabama statute at issue was designed to keep indigent, primar-
ily black, farm-workers permanently indebted to white farm-
owners,2 Hughes began his decision by "disniss[ing] from con-
sideration the fact that plaintiff in error is a black man."25 He
continued: "No question of a sectional character is presented,
21. Remarks of John Lord O'Brian, in PROcEEDINGs OF THE BAR AND OF-
FICERS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, IN MEMORY OF
CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 48 (1950) (quoting Justice Hughes) (emphasis in orig-
inal).
In a September 1, 1948 condolence letter after Hughes's death, Walter
White, the Secretary of the NAACP, wrote: "Thirty years ago [Hughes's] voice
was raised at Carnegie Hall against lynching and other denials of basic human
and constitutional rights to American Negroes and other minorities. Today's
concerns with civil liberties is due to the vision and courage of others like him.
We are grateful for his leadership." Id. at 104.
22. 219 U.S. 219 (1911). For a discussion of Bailey and the other peonage
cases, see Benno Schmidt, Jr., Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court
and Race in the Progressive Era." The Peonage Cases, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 646
(1982).
23. 219 U.S. at 245.
24. The United States, as amicus curiae, noted that "[t]he statute hits es-
pecially, as was intended, negro laborers on farms and plantations. Every re-
ported case under the statute is that of a farm laborer. The maximum penalty
fixed by the statute, $300, also makes it peculiarly applicable to this class of
laborers." Id. at 222-23; see also Schmidt, supra note 22, at 680-81.
25. 219 U.S. at 231.
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and we may view the legislation in the same manner as if it had
been enacted in New York or in Idaho. '26
Hughes may be fairly criticized for downplaying the racial
aspects of this case. However, in so doing, he undoubtedly held
together a majority of a court that was decidedly unsympathetic
to legal claims by blacks.27 Hughes also articulated the impor-
tant point that the Reconstruction Amendments' guarantees
protected all Americans, and thus that civil rights was not a pe-
culiarly black issue. "Opportunities for coercion and oppres-
sion, in varying circumstances, exist in all parts of the Union,"
Hughes wrote, "and the citizens of all the States are interested
in the maintenance of the constitutional guarantees, the consid-
eration of which is here involved."28
In McCabe v. Atchison Topeka & Sante Fe Ry., 29 five black
Oklahomans sued to enjoin the state from enforcing a state law
that permitted railroad companies to deny blacks access to first-
class railcars. In his opinion for the Court, Hughes reaffirmed
Plessy's holding that the Fourteenth Amendment allowed
Oklahoma "to require separate, but equal, accommodations for
the two races. °30 However, he then destroyed the state's argu-
ment that the denial of first-class services to black passengers
was justified by the Legislature's finding that "'there was no
substantial demand for Pullman car and dining car service for
persons of the African race.' "31 Hughes wrote:
This argument with respect to volume of traffic seems to us to be
without merit. It makes the constitutional right depend upon the
number of persons who may be discriminated against, whereas the es-
sence of the constitutional right is that it is a personal one. Whether
26. Id.
27. See Schmidt, supra note 22, at 681-82 (discussing Justice Harlan's deci-
sion to appoint Justice Hughes to write the majority opinion in Bailey).
28. 219 U.S. at 231.
29. 235 U.S. 151 (1914). For an analysis of the Supreme Court's decision in
McCabe, see Benno Schmidt, Jr., Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court
and Race in the Progressive Era: The Heyday of Jim Crow, 82 COLUM. L. REv.
444, 485-94 (1982). Professor Schmidt notes that Justices White, Holmes, La-
mar, and McReynolds "concurred only in the affirmance, thereby disassociat-
ing themselves from Hughes's opinion." Id. at 488. Professor Schmidt cites a
fascinating memorandum from Hughes to Justice Holmes, which indicates that
Holmes believed that the Oklahoma law should have been construed to permit
"separate but equal," not partitioned, luxury cars for blacks and whites. Id.
Hughes concluded his message to his colleague by stating- "I don't see that it
is a case calling for 'logical exactness' in enforcing equal rights, but rather as it
seems to me it is a bald, wholly unjustified, discrimination against a passenger
wholly on account of race." Id. at 490.
30. 235 U.S. at 160.
31. Id. at 161 (quoting the brief of counsel for the railway company).
1108 [Vol. 76:1099
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or not particular facilities shall be provided may doubtless be condi-
tioned upon there being a reasonable demand therefor, but, if facili-
ties are provided, substantial equality of treatment of persons
traveling under like conditions cannot be refused.3 2
Ironically, this ringing endorsement of the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of equal treatment had no effect on
the appellants in McCabe. Hughes concluded his opinion by
holding that the appellants were not entitled to injunctive re-
lief, as they had not demonstrated that they had been actually
injured by the statute.33
2. James C. McReynolds
In contrast, the Supreme Court tenure of James C. Mc-
Reynolds, perhaps the most bigoted justice to sit on the
Supreme Court in this century,-4 is an example of the disas-
trous consequences of a president's ill-considered Supreme
Court appointment. Born in 1862 in Elkton, Kentucky, Mc-
Reynolds rose to prominence as a conservative and puritanical
antitrust attorney during the Theodore Roosevelt and Taft ad-
ministrations. In 1913, Woodrow Wilson named McReynolds as
his attorney general, where McReynolds' bad temper and poor
judgment in the handling of several politically sensitive matters
made his tenure "brief and disastrous."35 In 1914, Wilson rid
himself of this cantankerous and controversial cabinet member
by appointing him to the Supreme Court.
McReynolds did not reform himself during his judicial ca-
reer. It was with just a touch of hyperbole that Harold Laski
remarked that "McReynolds and the theory of a beneficent de-
ity are quite incompatible. '36 The Justice was intolerably rude
to his colleagues, acidly sarcastic to the attorneys who appeared
before him, and generally reactionary in his conduct and judi-
cial opinions. Hughes' predecessor as chief justice, William
Howard Taft, observed that McReynolds was "selfish to the last
degree" and "fuller of prejudice than any man I have ever
32. Id.
33. Id. at 162-64.
34. See Randall Kennedy, Race Relations Law and the Tradition of Cele-
bration: The Case of Professor Schmidt, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1622, 1641 (1986).
As Professor Kennedy observes, McReynolds's white supremacist allegiances
became more pronounced as the Hughes Court began showing more concern
for the legal rights of blacks. Id.
35. David Burner, James C. McReynolds, in THE JusTIcEs OF THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969: THEIR LrvEs AND MAJOR OPINIONS 2023,
2026 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1969).
36. Id at 2024 (quoting Laski).
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known."37 Anecdotes about his racist, anti-Semitic, and sexist
conduct are legion. In 1938, Charles Hamilton Houston, a bril-
liant black lawyer with the NAACP and a former member of
the Harvard Law Review argued a landmark desegregation case
before the Supreme Court. During Houston's oral argument,
McReynolds turned his back on the attorney and stared at the
back wall of the courtroom.38 He once referred to Howard Uni-
versity, a historically black institution in Washington, D.C., as a
"nigger university."39 He repeatedly snubbed Justices Brandeis
and Cardozo because of their Jewish faith.40
A stalwart opponent of New Deal economic reforms, Mc-
Reynolds also vociferously resisted the Court's growing liber-
alism in civil rights cases. His bitter dissents, often joined by
his reactionary colleague from Minnesota, Justice Pierce But-
37. ALPHEUS T. MASON, WILLIAM HowARD TAFT CHIEF JUSTICE 215
(1964) (quoting Taft).
38. Videotaped interview with the Honorable Robert Carter, District
Judge, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (Aug. 1987)
(discussing Judge Carter's observation of the oral argument in Missouri ex reL.
Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938)); see also infrma notes 112-18 and accom-
panying text (discussing Gaines).
39. In his autobiography, Justice William 0. Douglas described how Mc-
Reynolds received a rare, but well deserved, comeuppance when he made this
disparaging comment about Howard University.
One day McReynolds went to the barbershop in the Court. Gates, the
black barber, put the sheet around his neck and over his lap, and as
he was pinning it behind him McReynolds said, "Gates, tell me, where
is this nigger university in Washington, D.C.?" Gates removed the
white cloth from McReynolds, walked around and faced him, and said
in a very calm and dignified manner, "Mr. Justice, I am shocked that
any Justice would call a Negro a nigger. There is a Negro college in
Washington, D.C. Its name is Howard University and we are very
proud of it." McReynolds muttered some kind of an apology and
Gates resumed his work in silence.
WLIiAM 0. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS: 1939-1975, at 14-15 (1980). McReyn-
olds, who died in 1946, never saw the most famous graduate of Howard Uni-
versity's law school, Thurgood Marshall, argue the Brown case in 1953 and
1954, and become the first black Supreme Court justice in 1967.
40. See Burner, supra note 35, at 2023. In 1922, McReynolds turned down
an invitation by Chief Justice Taft to accompany him and other justices to a
ceremonial visit to Philadelphia. He explained to the Chief Justice: "As you
know, I am not always to be found when there is a Hebrew abroad. Therefore,
my 'inability' to attend must not surprise you." MASON, supra note 37, at 216-
17. In 1924, McReynolds refused to take his place next to Brandeis for the of-
ficial Court photograph, forcing the cancellation of the photographic session.
I& at 217.
McReynolds remained hostile to these two Jewish justices throughout
their tenure on the court. He refused to attend Cardozo's funeral services in
1938 or to sign the Court's letter of regret about the resignation of Brandeis in
1939. LEONARD BAKER, BRANDEIS AND FRANKFURTER 357, 370 (1984).
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ler, railed against the Court's decisions remedying racial dis-
crimination in jury selection,41 criminal trials, the electoral
process, 4 3 and schools."
B. THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS
A series of criminal cases in the 1930s gave the Supreme
Court a stark education about the injustices that blacks faced in
the American criminal justice system. The justices were not
yet prepared to question the legal basis of racial segregation,
but these cases forced them to address the openly racist and un-
fair treatment of black defendants in southern courts. In so do-
41. Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 315 (1931) (McReynolds, J.,
dissenting). For additional discussion of this case, see infra text accompanying
notes 50-52. In a seething dissent, typical of his writings on racial matters, Jus-
tice McReynolds ignored the daily reality of race relations in the District of
Columbia, observing that "[n]othing is revealed by the record which tends to
show that any juror entertained prejudice which might have impaired his abil-
ity fairly to pass upon the issues." 283 U.S. at 317. He concluded by scolding
his colleagues for increasing the difficulty of law enforcement "by excessive
theorizing of or by magnifying what in practice is not really important." I&i at
318.
42. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932) (Butler, J., dissenting). For
additional discussion of this case, see infra text accompanying notes 53-59.
McReynolds joined Butler's dissent, which ignored the overwhelming evidence
of injustice, blandly concluding "[tihe record wholly fails to reveal that peti-
tioners have been deprived of any right guaranteed by the Federal Constitu-
tion." 287 U.S. at 77.
43. Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 89 (1932) (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
For additional discussion of this case, see infra text accompanying notes 121-
25. The majority decision overturned a Texas law which permitted the state
Democratic party to prohibit blacks from voting in its primary elections. 286
U.S. at 89. McReynolds did not dispute the petitioner's contention that Texas
was "overwhelmingly Democratic and nomination by the primaries of that
party is equivalent to an election." I&L at 91. However, he saw no constitu-
tional difficulties in the exclusion of blacks from the Democratic primary, not-
ing that "[p]olitical parties are fruits of voluntary action. Where there is no
unlawful purpose, citizens may create them at will and limit their membership
as seems wise." Id. at 104.
44. Missouri ex reL Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 353 (1938) (McReyn-
olds, J., dissenting). For additional discussion of this case, see infra notes 112-
18 and accompanying text. The Gaines Court held that Missouri's refusal to
admit a qualified black applicant to the state's only public law school violated
the Fourteenth Amendment. 305 U.S. at 337. In his vitriolic dissent, McReyn-
olds castigated his colleagues for their failure to defer to Missouri's longstand-
ing view "that the best interest of her people demands separation of whites
and negroes in schools." Id at 353. McReynolds believed that under the ma-
jority decision, Missouri could either "abandon her law school and thereby dis-
advantage her white citizens without improving petitioner's opportunities for
legal instruction or she may break down the settled practice concerning sepa-




ing, the Supreme Court accelerated a trend it had begun with
decisions in Frank v. Mangum 45 and Moore v. Dempsey,46 cases
applying the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause to
require the states to conduct fair criminal proceedings.47
The Hughes Court's landmark criminal justice cases were
dramatic proof that in the criminal justice field the "separate
but equal" concept of Plessy was not working in accordance
with the rationale of equality that the Court had articulated in
1896. In Plessy, counsel had argued that separation of facilities
on an intrastate train "stamp[ed] the colored race with a badge
of inferiority. '48 The Supreme Court responded, "[i]f this be so,
it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely be-
cause the colored race chooses to put that construction upon
it." '49 In contrast, the Hughes Court's criminal justice cases
demonstrated that courts treated black criminal defendants far
more harshly than their white counterparts, and that this har-
sher treatment was not a figment of blacks' imaginations.
These cases demonstrated that in many areas of the country
the treatment of blacks was both separate and unequal. In ob-
45. 237 U.S. 309 (1915). Although denying relief to the petitioner, the
Court held that if a state "supplying no corrective process, carries into execu-
tion a judgment of death or imprisonment based upon a verdict thus produced
by mob domination, the State deprives the accused of his life or liberty with-
out due process of law." Id at 335.
46. 261 U.S. 86 (1923). The petitioners in Moore were. sentenced to death
by an Arkansas court for killing a white man during a race riot sparked by an
attack on a group of blacks assembled in a church. Id at 87. The defendants
were saved from lynching only through the presence of federal troops. Id- at
88. Black witnesses were tortured and whipped to provide incriminating testi-
mony, and blacks were systematically excluded from the grand and petit juries
in the case. Id at 89. The court-appointed defense counsel did not consult
with their clients before trial; did not request a continuance, change of venue,
or separate trials; failed to challenge any prospective jurors; called no wit-
nesses; and did not put the defendants on the stand. Id After a 45-minute
trial and five minutes of jury deliberation, the defendants were sentenced to
death. id
Faced with this massive, undeniable evidence of a gross miscarriage of jus-
tice, the Supreme Court held that if a state criminal proceeding is
a mask-that counsel, jury, and judge were swept to the fatal end by
an irresistible wave of public passion, and that the State Courts failed
to correct the wrong, neither perfection in the machinery for correc-
tion nor the possibility that the trial court and counsel saw no other
way of avoiding an immediate outbreak of the mob can prevent this
Court from securing to the petitioners their constitutional rights.
Id. at 91.
47. See RICHARD C. CORTNER, A "ScoTTSBORO" CASE IN MISSISSIPPI: THE
SUPREME CouRT AND BROWN v. MISSISSIPPI 116-20 (1986).




serving the extraordinarily disparate treatment black criminal
defendants received in the courts, the justices undoubtedly
must have recognized that a political system that permitted
such gross racial discrimination even within its halls of justice
would probably have similar inequities in its segregated schools,
universities, and public facilities, and in other aspects of its
public and private culture.
The Supreme Court's new direction in criminal justice mat-
ters became apparent shortly after Hughes became chief justice
in 1930. The Court reversed the conviction of a black defendant
sentenced to death for the murder of a white policeman. 50 The
District of Columbia trial judge had refused to permit the de-
fense to question prospective jurors about their racial
prejudices.51 In his opinion, Hughes remarked that "[n]o surer
way could be devised to bring the processes of justice into disre-
pute" than to "permit it to be thought that persons entertaining
a disqualifying prejudice were allowed to serve as jurors."52
In the famous Scottsboro cases, the Court reviewed the tri-
als of several black youths, ages thirteen to nineteen, who were
charged with raping two white girls in a freight car in Ala-
bama.53 The defendants were indicted, tried, convicted, and
sentenced to death within two and a half weeks of the inci-
dent.M The trial judge did not name a lawyer for the defend-
ants until the morning of trial.5 Each defendant's trial lasted
no more than a single day.-6 All were conducted after white
protesters swarmed into the small town of Scottsboro, Ala-
bama.57 Hundreds of militia were stationed around the court-
house.58 The Supreme Court called the trials' setting a
"community... of great hostility."5 9 The scene could more ap-
propriately be characterized as a hysterical lynch mob
environment.
In Powell v. Alabama,60 the first of three opinions involv-
50. Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 315 (1931).
51. Id. at 310.
52. Id- at 315.
53. For a description of the facts and conditions surrounding the trials, see
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 49-53 (1932).
54. Id-
55. Id at 56.
56. Id at 50.
57. Id. at 51.
58. Id
59. Id
60. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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hig the Scottsboro defendants, 61 the Court reversed the con-
demned black youths' convictions.62 To build consensus in this
highly politicized case, Chief Justice Hughes assigned the ma-
jority opinion to the conservative Justice George Sutherland of
Utah.6 3 Sutherland's carefully crafted opinion documented the
"atmosphere of tense, hostile and excited public sentiment"64
that surrounded the Scottsboro trial and the trial court's rush
to convict the unrepresented, poorly educated and frightened
young defendants.
In its landmark ruling, the Court held that due process re-
quires state trial courts to appoint attorneys for indigent de-
fendants in death penalty cases.65 In a marked departure from
the dry, abstract language that characterized most of the
Court's previous civil rights decisions, Sutherland's opinion was
clearly animated by the evidence of oppressively racist condi-
tions that almost leapt from the trial record. Sutherland stated:
[I]n the light of the facts outlined in the opinion-the ignorance and
illiteracy of the defendants, their youth, the circumstances of public
hostility, the imprisonment and the close surveillance of the defend-
ants by the military forces, the fact that their friends and families
were all in other states and communication with them necessarily dif-
ficult, and above all that they stood in deadly peril of their lives-we
think the failure of the trial court to give them reasonable time and
opportunity to secure counsel was a clear denial of due process.
66
Although the principles of fundamental fairness underlying the
Due Process Clause mandated this holding, the stark racial in-
justice of the Scottsboro trial moved a majority of the Court to
reach this result long before they might have otherwise have
done so.
In Norris v. Alabama,67 the second Scottsboro decision,
Chief Justice Hughes held, for a unanimous Court,68 that the
systematic exclusion of all black citizens of Jackson County,
Alabama from the jury rolls violated the Equal Protection
Clause.69 This case is remarkable not for its holding, which es-
61. The other two opinions were Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935),
discussed infra text accompanying notes 67-72, and Patterson v. Alabama, 294
U.S. 600 (1935), discussed infra note 72.
62. 287 U.S. at 73.
63. See 2 MERLO J. PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 724 (1951).
64. 287 U.S. at 51.
65. Id at 71.
66. Id.
67. 294 U.S. 587 (1935).




sentially reinforced a longstanding constitutional doctrine,70 but
because of the Court's readiness to examine the discriminatory
application of a facially neutral jury selection system. In words
that would later haunt those who attempted to hide racist mo-
tives behind the veil of "objective" factfinding, Hughes stated
that the Supreme Court must determine not only whether a
federal right has been denied "in express terms," but also
whether it has been denied "in substance and effect."'71 He ad-
ded: "If this requires an examination of evidence, that exami-
nation must be made. Otherwise, review by this Court would
fail of its purpose in safeguarding constitutional rights."72
Unfortunately, as federal courts have continued to combat
the most blatant forms of racial discrimination in jury selec-
tion, legislatures, prosecutors, and jury commissioners have de-
veloped an imaginative array of devices to bar blacks and other
minorities from the jury box. Sadly, recent cases show that the
American criminal justice system is still some distance from its
constitutional objective of color-blind jury selection.73
70. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1880) (invalidating a
West Virginia statute which restricted jury service to "white male persons").
71. 294 U.S. at 590.
72. I&
In Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 600 (1935), the third and final Scott-
sboro decision, another Scottsboro defendant challenged the systematic exclu-
sion of blacks from jury duty in Jackson County, Alabama. The Alabama
Supreme Court refused to consider the substance of his appeal because of the
untimely filing of his bill of exceptions. IM at 602. Noting that the Alabama
Supreme Court decided Norris and Patterson on the same day, Chief Justice
Hughes remanded the case to the state court to allow it to reconsider what
would ordinarily be deemed a non-federal and non-reviewable question of
state procedure. Id at 606-07. Because of the "exceptional features of the
present case," i& at 605, involving a challenge to the now discredited jury se-
lection scheme of Jackson County, Chief Justice Hughes concluded that "the
state court should have an opportunity to examine its powers in the light of
the situation which has now developed," id- at 607.
One of Hughes's biographers later observed: "[The basic motivating con-
sideration in [the Patterson] opinion was the awful contemplation that for a
technical defect in procedure a human being might be sent to his death. With
a little ingenuity in reasoning, the technical requirements of the law were
subordinated to the ends of justice." SAMUEL HENDEL, CHARLES EVANS
HUGHES AND THE SUPREME CoURT 161 (1951).
After Norris, the Hughes Court re-emphasized on two occasions the con-
stitutional rule against racial discrimination in jury selection. See Pierre v.
Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939); Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613 (1938) (per
curiam).
73. Recent cases reveal an imaginative array of methods used to limit
black participation in juries. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 83
(1986) (blacks excluded through peremptory challenges); Swain v. Alabama,
380 U.S. 202, 209-22 (1965) (blacks excluded through peremptory challenges);
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Anyone searching for a particularly egregious civil rights
violation in American history is well advised to begin reviewing
the reported Mississippi cases.7 4 Brown v. Mississippi75 is one
Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 560-61 (1953) (jurors selected by means of ra-
dally coded tickets); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 402 (1942) (jury commissioners
selected jurors from among their personal acquaintances); Labat v. Bennett,
365 F.2d 698, 713 (5th Cir. 1966) (exclusion of hourly wage earners), cert de-
nied, 386 U.S. 991 (1967); Rabinowitz v. United States, 366 F.2d 34, 40 (5th Cir.
1966) (blacks excluded through a system of panel selection in which "respecta-
ble" citizens were asked to recommend others for jury duty); United States ex
rel Goldsby v. Harpole, 263 F.2d 71, 77-78 (5th Cir.) (jury lists drawn from
voter registration lists, from which blacks were excluded), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 838 (1959); see also LAWRENCE D. RIcE, THE NEGRO IN TEXAS: 1874-1900,
at 255-57 (1971) (blacks excluded through subjective eligibility criteria for jury
duty, jury commissioner discretion, literacy qualifications). See generally JACK
BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES 278-85 (1981) (discussing race discrimination in jury
selection in the Fifth Circuit during the 1950s and 1960s); BELL, RACE LAW,
supra note 6, at 235-77 (discussing judicial background of racism in jury selec-
tion).
As Justice Marshall noted in his Batson concurrence, an instruction hand-
book used by the Dallas, Texas prosecutor's office in the 1970s "explicitly ad-
vised prosecutors that they conduct jury selection so as to eliminate 'any
member of a minority group.'" 476 U.S. at 104 (citation omitted). An earlier
jury-selection guide used by those same prosecutors phrased this advice more
bluntly: "Do not take Jews, Negroes, Dagos, Mexicans, or a member of any
minority race on a jury, no matter how rich or well educated." Id. at 104 n.3
(citation omitted).
In Clark v. City of Bridgeport, 645 F. Supp. 890 (D. Conn. 1986), the city
attorney candidly admitted that he struck eight of eight black venirepersons
on purely racial grounds. When asked to justify his peremptory challenges, he
stated:
[I]f I had a choice between a white juror and a black juror under the
facts of these cases, I'm going to take a white juror. That's what I'm
saying.... [W]hy should I put my city and my defendants at the
mercy of the people in my opinion who make the most civil rights
claims, at least in my experience.
Id& at 894.
Last year, in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991),
the Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution forbade the use of peremptory
challenges to exclude blacks in civil cases. Writing for the Court, Justice Ken-
nedy pointed out that "[b]y enforcing a discriminatory peremptory challenge,
[a] court 'has not only made itself a party to the [biased act], but has elected to
place its power, property and prestige behind the alleged discrimination."' Id.
at 2085 (quoting Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725
(1961)).
The Supreme Court last year also emphasized that racially motivated per-
emptory challenges are not a peculiarly black concern, holding in Powers v.
Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991), that a white criminal defendant may challenge the
discriminatory exclusion of black citizens from a jury. Id at 1374.
74. Theodore G. Bilbo, who was elected as Mississippi's governor in 1915
and 1927, and who served as its U.S. senator from 1935 to 1947, exemplified the
starkly racist nature of Mississippi politics during the Hughes era. Bilbo stren-
uously opposed federal anti-lynching legislation in the late 1930s, stating:
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example. In 1934, three impoverished and "ignorant" Negroes
in Kempner County, Mississippi were suspected of murdering a
white man. A deputy sheriff and several of his white cronies
brutalized the defendants with some of the most extreme tor-
ture ever revealed in a reported American case. One defend-
ant, Yank Ellington, so enraged a mob of twenty white men
with his professions of innocence that they whipped him and
twice hung him from a tree before finally releasing him to re-
turn home in agony.7 6 Two days later, the deputy again seized
Ellington and took him to jail by a circuitous route that led into
the State of Alabama.7 7 While in Alabama, the deputy again se-
verely whipped the defendant until he "agreed to confess to
such a statement as the deputy would dictate, ... after which
he was delivered to jail."7 8
The same deputy then arrested two other black men, Ed
Brown and Henry Shields. One night, the deputy, the jailer,
and several other white men made the defendants strip. The
two men were then "laid over chairs and their backs were cut
to pieces with a leather strap with buckles on it." ' 79 They were
rTlhe underlying motive of the Ethiopian who has inspired this pro-
posed legislation ... and desires its enactment into law with a zeal
and a frenzy equal if not paramount to the lust and lasciviousness of
the rape fiend in his diabolical effort to despoil the womanhood of the
Caucasian race, is to realize the consummation of his dream... to be-
come socially and politically equal to the white man.
CORTNER, supra note 47, at 48 (citation omitted).
Bilbo followed the racist tradition of his predecessor, Governor James K.
Vardaman, who joined the chorus of outrage by Southern politicians when
President Theodore Roosevelt had lunch with the moderate black leader
Booker T. Washington. Vardamen wrote:
It is said that men follow the bent of their geniuses, and that prenatal
influences are often potent in shaping thoughts and ideas in after life.
Probably old lady Roosevelt, during the period of gestation, was
frightened by a dog, and that fact may account for the qualities of the
male pup that are so prominent in Teddy. I would not do either an
injustice, but am disposed to apologize to the dog for mentioning it.
MILLER, supra note 6, at 206-07 (citation omitted). As a Senator, Vardamen
continued to use Booker T. Washington as a foil for his racist rhetoric, stating-
"I am just as much opposed to Booker Washington as a voter, with all his An-
glo-Saxon reenforcements, as I am to the cocoanut-headed, chocolate-covered,
typical little coon, Andy Dotson, who blacks my shoes every morning. Neither
is fit to perform the supreme function of citizenship." 1 HARVARD SrrKOFF, A
NEW DEAL FOR BLACKS: THE EMERGENCE OF CIViL RIGHTS AS A NATIONAL Is-
sUE: THE DEPRESSION DECADE 8 (1978) (citation omitted).
75. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
76. Id at 281.
77. I at 281-82.




repeatedly whipped and told that the whipping would continue
until they admitted "in every matter of detail" a confession "in
the exact form and contents as desired by the mob."' 0 During a
two-day trial, the rope burns on Ellington's neck were clearly
visible,81 and the deputy sheriff and others freely admitted to
the beating of all three defendants.8 2 The deputy testified that
Ellington's whipping by the mob was "[n]ot too much for a ne-
gro; not as much as I would have done if it was left to me."83
Despite the clear evidence that the defendants' pretrial state-
ments were coerced, the trial court denied the defendants' mo-
tion to suppress the "confessions."' s The three men were
convicted and sentenced to death.8 5 The aggressive young at-
torney prosecuting the case was John Stennis, and he did not
deny the severe police brutality. This case was one of the first
steps in a political career that would later lead Stennis into be-
coming an "esteemed" member of the United States Senate.86
80. Id.
81. Id. at 281.
82. Id. at 284-85. T.H. Nicholson, the marshal of Scooba, Mississippi, testi-
fied that defendants Ed Brown and Henry Shields "had been whipped some"
at the time of their initial confessions. Record from the United States
Supreme Court at 102, Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (No. 301) (re-
printing the record of the trial court).
E.L. Gilbert, another witness for the State, also stated that Shields and
Brown were whipped during their interrogations. Gilbert admitted participat-
ing in the beating of Brown, stating: "We told him any time he wanted to talk,
we would let him up, and he got up." Id. at 106.
Kemper County Deputy Sheriff Cliff Dial acknowledged that he was pres-
ent when a mob of 20 men whipped and tried to hang Ellington, id. at 111-12,
but that he interceded to save Ellington because he "didn't want any of the
negroes beat up," id, at 108. However, Dial's concern for the defendant's well-
being was mercurial. He admitted that after Shields and Brown had professed
their innocence, three days later, he and his companions "kind of warmed
them a little," until they finally confessed. Id, at 113. Dial also testified that
he "strapped Yank [Ellington] a little bit" during the trip into Alabama, and
that Ellington also confessed after this treatment. Id, at 114.
83. Record at 112, Brown (No. 301).
84. 297 U.S. at 279.
85. Id.
86. In 1985, a flattering profile of Stennis in the New York Times charac-
terized the senior senator from Mississippi as "the undisputed patriarch of the
Senate, a teacher to younger members and a conscience for the entire institu-
tion." Steven V. Roberts, Wisdom in Judgmen4 38 Years in the Making, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 4, 1985, at B10. However, the same article mentions that Stennis
established his reputation in his first year in the Senate by being selected to
lead a floor debate against a civil rights bill, "an unusual honor for a junior
legislator." Id. It was not until 1982 that Stennis "'reluctantly' cast his first
vote for a civil rights bill, one extending the Voting Rights Act." Marjorie
Hunter, Profile: John C. Stennis; Plowing a Straight Line to the End of the
Row, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 6, 1987, at A18.
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Over a strident dissent from two judges,87 the Mississippi
Supreme Court disregarded the defense attorney's protest that
the defendants' coerced confessions were invalid and inherently
unreliable.""
In an appeal argued by former Mississippi Governor Earl
Brewer and partially financed by the NAACP,8 9 the United
States Supreme Court set aside the convictions and death
sentences as a violation of due process. Writing for a unani-
mous court, Chief Justice Hughes stated that although a state
could adopt criminal procedures "in accordance with its own
conceptions of policy," it could not institute a "trial by
ordeal."90  In language that bristled with outrage, Hughes
continued:
The rack and torture chamber may not be substituted for the witness
stand. The State may not permit an accused to be hurried to convic-
tion under mob domination-where the whole proceeding is but a
mask-without supplying corrective process.... It would be difficult
to conceive of methods more revolting to the sense of justice than
those taken to procure the confessions of these petitioners, and the
use of the confessions thus obtained as the basis for conviction and
87. A dissent by Mississippi Supreme Court Justice Virgil Alexis Griffith,
joined by Justice William D. Anderson, described the torture of the three
Brown defendants in gruesome detail. Justice Griffith concluded his dissent-
ing opinion with an unusually explicit invitation to the U.S. Supreme Court to
reverse his colleagues' majority opinion, stating:
If this judgment be affirmed by the federal Supreme Court, it will be
the first in the history of that court wherein there was allowed to
stand a conviction based solely upon testimony coerced by the barbari-
ties of executive officers of the state, known to the prosecuting of-
ficers of the state as having been so coerced, when the testimony was
introduced, and fully shown in all its nakedness to the trial judge
before he closed the case and submitted it to the jury, and when all
this is not only undisputed, but is expressly and openly admitted.
Brown v. State, 161 So. 465, 472 (Miss. 1935) (Griffith, J., dissenting).
The strength and eloquence of Griffith's dissent was of incalculable value
in publicizing the Brown case and in persuading the United States Supreme
Court to review the Mississippi decision. CORTNER, s-upra note 47, at 81-86.
Chief Justice Hughes quoted Griffith's dissent at length in his factual sum-
mary, agreeing with his state court colleague that the trial transcript "reads
more like pages torn from some medieval account, than a record made within
the confines of a modern civilization which aspires to an enlightened constitu-
tional government." 297 U.S. at 282 (quoting 161 So. at 470 (Griffith, J.,
dissenting)).
88. 161 So. at 465. Ironically, on the same day that the Mississippi
Supreme Court announced its decision in Brown, the United States Senate was
consumed by a bitter and ultimately successful filibuster to defeat an anti-
lynching bill. Filibuster Balks Efforts to Speed Roosevelt Bills, N.Y. TimEs,
Apr. 30, 1935, at Al.
89. See CORTNER, supra note 47, at 89-106.
90. 297 U.S. at 285.
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sentence was a clear denial of due process.91
In 1940, the Court reaffirmed the principle, announced in
Brown v. Mississippi, that involuntary confessions are inadmis-
sible. In Chambers v. F/orida,92  several "ignorant young
colored tenant farmers"93 were imprisoned, held incommuni-
cado, beaten, threatened and questioned almost continuously by
the police until they finally "confessed." 94
In a unanimous opinion by Justice Hugo Black, the Court
reversed the convictions, finding that the police coercion ren-
dered the defendants' confessions invalid. "We are not im-
pressed," Justice Black wrote, "by the argument that law
enforcement methods such as those under review are necessary
to uphold our laws. The Constitution proscribes such lawless
means irrespective of the end."95 The opinion by Justice Black
was of great significance because it was one of his first decisions
on the Court. Critics attacked Black's nomination because of
his previous membership in the Ku Klux Klan, but he made his
judicial philosophy clear in Chambers, where he wrote that
"courts stand . . . as havens of refuge for those who might
otherwise suffer because they are helpless, weak, outnumbered,
or . . . are non-conforming victims of prejudice and public
excitement. '96
Until quite recently, the Court firmly adhered to the prin-
91. Id at 285-86.
92. 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
A contemporary account gives some sense of the atmosphere surrounding
the issuance of the Chambers decision.
The court's unanimous and extended opinion was based on the
constitutional "due process" clause in the Fourteenth Amendment,
passed after the Civil War to protect the newly granted rights of Ne-
groes from arbitrary State judicial action.
It was handed down on the anniversary of the birth of Abraham
Lincoln, who was chiefly responsible in obtaining the basis of these
rights for the liberated and enfranchised Negro race, and it was voiced
eloquently by Justice Black, who admitted, after his nomination to
the high bench, that he had once been a member of the Ku Klux
Klan.
The drama of the occasion, due to the date of the opinion, the
background of the justice rendering it, the defense of constitutional
principles and the broad overtones of the court's denunciation of the
exercise of dictatorial power by any government, was not lost upon
the audience which crowded the great marble court chamber.
Frederick R. Barkley, High Court Saves 4 Doomed Negroes, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb.
13, 1940, at Al.
93. 309 U.S. at 238.
94. Id. at 238-40.
95. Id. at 240-41.
96. Id. at 241.
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ciple enunciated in Brown and Chambers that coerced confes-
sions have absolutely no place in criminal trials.9 7
A little known in forma pauperis case also shows the
Hughes Court's growing sensitivity to the plight of blacks in
southern courts. In White v. Texas,98 a black defendant sought
review of his state conviction for raping a white woman. The
Supreme Court originally denied White's poorly written certio-
rari petition.99 However, Chief Justice Hughes was persuaded
by White's rehearing petition that the Court might have acted
too hastily. He sent for the state court record, which revealed
that the Texas Rangers had coerced White's confession by third
degree methods. The Court summarily reversed the convic-
tion 00 and denied the state's rehearing petition in a scathing
opinion by Justice Black.' 10
In the midst of the retrial, White was shot and killed by
the husband of the alleged victim. White's murderer was ac-
quitted after the district attorney told the jury that the sup-
pression of the coerced confession had forced the husband to
take the law into his own hands.'0 2 According to Hughes's bi-
ographer, "[s]uch lawlessness in the name of law was sufficient
to keep Hughes vigilant in examining the in forma [pauperis]
cases.' 03 At the present time, when the Supreme Court is re-
stricting its review of in forma pauperis matters,1' 4 the Court's
97. In Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1263-65 (1991), a divided
Court held that the admission of an involuntary confession was subject to the
harmless error rule of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). Justice By-
ron White, writing for the four dissenters, stated that "permitting a coerced
confession to be part of the evidence on which a jury is free to base its verdict
of guilty is inconsistent with the thesis that ours is not an inquisitorial system
of criminal justice." 111 S. Ct. at 1256 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Chambers
v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 235-38 (1940)).
For an excellent analysis of the Fulminante decision, see Charles J. Ogle-
tree, Jr., Arizona v. Fulminante: The Harm of Applying Harmless Error to Co-
erced Confessions, 105 HARV. L. REV. 152 (1991).
98. 309 U.S. 631 (1940) (per curiam).
99. White v. Texas, 308 U.S. 608 (1939).
100. 309 U.S. at 631.
101. White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940) (denying the State's petition for
rehearing).
102. Edwin McElwain, The Business of the Supreme Court as Conducted by
Chief Justice Hughes, 63 HARV. L. REv. 5, 25-26 (1949).
103. PUSEY, supra note 63, at 727.
104. See In re Demos, 111 S. Ct. 1569 (1991) (denying certiorari petition by
prolific pro se litigant and denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis in all
future petitions of extraordinary relief); In re Sindram, 111 S. Ct. 596 (1991)
(denying motion by pro se litigant to proceed in forma pauperis on current or
future petitions for extraordinary relief); In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180 (1989)
(same); see also In re Amendment to Rule 39, 111 S. Ct. 1572, 1572 (1991)
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experience in White v. Texas bears remembering.
The Hughes Court's criminal cases mark the feeble begin-
nings of a criminal justice jurisprudence that ultimately would
curb the most severe abuses against blacks and other citizens
by police, jailers, district attorneys and judges.
C. EDUCATION
During Chief Justice Hughes's tenure, lawsuits challenging
the exclusion of blacks from public graduate schools spelled the
beginning of the end of school segregation. NAACP attorneys
such as Charles Hamilton Houston,10 5 Houston's cousin William
Henry Hastie 0 6 and Houston's student Thurgood Marshall0 7
orchestrated the legal attack.
In 1935, Lloyd L. Gaines, a twenty-five-year-old Missouri
citizen, graduated from Lincoln University, the state's segre-
gated black university. Gaines applied for admission to the
University of Missouri Law School, the only state-supported
law school in Missouri. Although a qualified applicant, he was
denied admission solely because he was black. The registrar ac-
knowledged that the University of Missouri admitted white stu-
dents from other states, Asian-American students, foreign
students-in fact, everyone except "students of African
(amending Rule 39 of the Supreme Court Rules to allow denial of leave to pro-
ceed with "frivolous" or "malicious" in forma pauperis proceedings).
In his dissent in Demos, Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Blackmun
and Stevens, wrote:
In closing its doors today to another indigent litigant, the Court moves
ever closer to the day when it leaves an indigent litigant with a meri-
torious claim out in the cold. And with each barrier that it places in
the way of indigent litigants, and with each instance in which it casti-
gates such litigants for having "abused the system," the Court can
only reinforce in the hearts and minds of our society's less fortunate
members the unsettling message that their pleas are not welcome
here.
111 S. Ct. at 1571-72 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
105. See MCNEIL, supra note 6, at 13, 52-53, 132-36.
106. See G. WARE, WILLIAM HAsTIE: GRACE UNDER PRESSURE 29, 85-86, 95-
96 (1984).
107. See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., An Open Letter to Justice Clarence
Thomas From a Federal Judicial Colleague, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1005, 1012-15
(1992); A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 105
HARV. L. REV. 55 (1991).
For thoughtful collections of articles on Justice Marshall, see also, Trib-
utes, 101 YALE L.J. 1 (1991); A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 6 HARV.





The Missouri Supreme Court unanimously held that the
State had satisfied its Fourteenth Amendment obligation to
Gaines by offering to subsidize his schooling in the law schools
of Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, or Nebraska, none of which excluded
blacks. s09 The court downplayed the fact that these schools
were as much as 300 to 400 miles from Gaines's St. Louis home,
stating that the necessity to travel great distances to attend an
out-of-state school was "but an incident to any classification for
school purposes and furnishes no substantial ground for
complaint."" 0
Charles Hamilton Houston, a brilliant black attorney and
former member of the Harvard Law Review, argued the Gaines
appeal on November 9, 1938."'1 In an opinion for the majority
in Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada,"2 Chief Justice Hughes
brushed aside the parties' extensive comparison of the legal
training at the University of Missouri and at out-of-state
schools, stating the comparison was "beside the point.11 Ac-
cording to the Court:
The question here is not of a duty of the State to supply legal train-
ing, or of the quality of the training which it does supply, but of its
duty when it provides such training to furnish it to the residents of
the State upon the basis of an equality of right. By the operation of
the laws of Missouri a privilege has been created for white law stu-
dents which is denied to negroes by reason of their race.... That is a
denial of the equality of legal right to the enjoyment of the privilege
which the State has set up, and the provision for the payment of tui-
tion fees in another State does not remove the discrimination.1 14
In response to Missouri's assertion that the "limited de-
mand in Missouri for the legal education of negroes" justified
108. See State ex reL Gaines v. Canada, 113 S.W.2d 783, 785 (Mo. 1937),
rev'd, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
109. Id- at 790.
110. Id at 789. The Missouri Supreme Court reiterated its earlier determi-
nation that racial segregation was justified on the basis of "natural race pecu-
liarities" and "practical results":
'"There are differences in races, and between individuals of the same
race, not created by human laws, some of which can never be eradi-
cated. These differences create different social relations, recognized
by all well-organized governments. If we cast aside chimerical theo-
ries and look to practical results, it seems to us it must be conceded
that separate schools for colored children is a regulation to their great
advantage."
Id. at 788 (quoting Lehew v. Brummel, 15 S.W. 765, 766 (Mo. 1890)).
111. See MCNEIL, supra note 6, at 143-45, 149-50.
112. 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
113. Id. at 349.
114. Id- at 349-50.
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the discrimination in favor of whites, the Court stated that
Gaines's right was "a personal one."115 The Court stated that
Lloyd Gaines
as an individual ... was entitled to the equal protection of the laws,
and the State was bound to furnish him within its borders facilities
for legal education substantially equal to those which the State there
afforded for persons of the white race, whether or not other negroes
sought the same opportunity.
116
Gaines was the first Supreme Court decision to invalidate a
state's school segregation practices. The Court did not explic-
itly question the Plessy v. Ferguson "separate but equal" doc-
trine and, in fact, noted that the state could constitutionally
furnish equal facilities in separate schools for blacks and
whites.117 However, Gaines sounded the death knell of state-
sanctioned racial segregation, for it seriously eroded two impor-
tant legal foundations of Plessy's aberrant reading of the Equal
Protection Clause.
First, the Gaines opinion showed that the Court would no
longer automatically defer to the state's "discretion" to adopt
"reasonable" regulations to segregate the races in public
schools. For the first time in a segregation case, the United
States Supreme Court refused to defer to the states' authority
to regulate schools and actually scrutinized the content of the
state's segregation plan.
Second, the logic, if not the language, of Gaines under-
mined the peculiar notion of "equality" which was at the heart
of the "separate but equal" doctrine. Following Plessy, the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection for all
races took on a make-believe quality, as the Court strained to
uphold state action with clearly racist motives and undeniably
discriminatory effects.118 Gaines was the first sign that the
Court would no longer give "equality" such a tortured defini-
tion. The Court imposed a duty on the state to provide equal
educational opportunities for black students without regard to
the number of blacks who were in a position to take advantage
of those opportunities, and without regard to the availability of
115. Id at 350-51.
116. Id. at 351.
117. Id at 344.
118. Thus, grossly inequitable practices such as the closing of a county's
only black high school, Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S.
528 (1899), a state's prohibition of integrated private schools, Berea College v.
Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908), and the exclusion of all non-whites from white
schools in a dual school system, Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927), were
found to satisfy the state's obligation to provide equal protection to its citizens.
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those opportunities in other states. Although the Court limited
the Gaines holding to situations in which blacks were legally
excluded from state supported professional schools, Gaines
could not logically be confined to these facts. Because the
Court read the principle of actual equality of opportunity into
the Constitution, it was inevitable that some day the Court
would have to face the reality that all forms of de jure racial
segregation inevitably diminish the quality of services and op-
portunities available to blacks.
By cutting back on the Court's deferential standard of re-
view and moving toward an equal protection test of actual
equality, the decision in Gaines paved the way for the ultimate
victory in Brown v. Board of Education.
D. THE RIGHT TO VOTE
In the decades after the Civil War, the "respectable" lead-
ers of the white power structure in the South did more than
the terrorists of the Ku Klux Klan to bar blacks from the vot-
ing booth. Describing his state's experience in a speech to its
Constitutional Convention of 1890, Judge Chrisman of Lincoln
County, Mississippi said: "it is no secret that there has not
been a full vote and a fair count in Mississippi since 1875.2119
He stressed that "we have been preserving the ascendancy of
the white people by revolutionary methods. In plain words, we
have been stuffing ballot boxes, permitting perjury and here
and there in the State carrying the elections by fraud and vio-
lence until the whole machinery for elections was about to rot
down." 20
In varying degrees of intensity, the discrimination against
black voters persisted throughout the South. The Hughes
Court had a mixed record in protecting blacks' right to vote
under the Fifteenth Amendment. The Court showed a willing-
ness to remedy the most direct state-imposed obstacles to black
voting, but stopped far short of redressing indirect, but equally
effective methods of disenfranchising blacks.
The most significant barrier was the exclusion of black vot-
ers from the Democratic primary elections. In the essentially
one party Southern states, the winner of the Democratic pri-
mary almost invariably won the later general elections. Thus,
states could deny blacks any meaningful role in the electoral





process by the simple expedient of declaring the all-white pri-
mary elections the activities of "private" political parties.
After the Supreme Court's 1927 decision invalidating a
Texas law that flatly prohibited blacks from voting in the
state's Democratic primary,"2 1 the Texas Legislature enacted an
"emergency" statute that permitted the party's executive com-
mittee "to prescribe the qualifications of its own members and
... in its own way determine who shall be qualified to vote or
otherwise participate in such political party."'22 The Demo-
cratic Executive Committee promptly restricted participation in
the party's primary to "white Democrats."' 23 In Nixon v. Con-
don,124 the Court, in an opinion by Justice Benjamin Cardozo,
struck down the State's attempt to circumvent the Court's prior
ruling, finding that the State had unconstitutionally empow-
ered the Texas Democratic party to "discriminate invidiously
between white citizens and black. The Fourteenth Amend-
ment, adopted as it was with special solicitude for the equal
protection of members of the Negro race, lays a duty upon the
court to level by its judgment these barriers of color."'2 5
Despite Cardozo's ringing rhetoric, the Court's enthusiasm
for demolishing voting barriers to blacks soon faltered. After
Nixon v. Condon, the Texas Democratic Party passed a resolu-
tion at a party convention restricting membership to qualified
"white citizens."'1 26  The Court unanimously upheld this
method of disenfranchising blacks, blithely concluding in
Grovey v. Townsend that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ments did not prohibit a private political party from barring
blacks if the state did not directly authorize or compel this pol-
icy.127 Thus, the Court accepted the hypocritical fiction that so
long as blacks were afforded a meaningless right to vote in the
general election, they could constitutionally be banned from
the critical primary election.128 As one commentator aptly ob-
served, after Grovey, "the southern states remained at liberty
121. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
122. See Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 82 (1932).
123. Id.
124. 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
125. Id. at 89 (citations omitted).
126. Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45, 47 (1935), overruled by Smith v. All-
wright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
127. Id. at 55.
128. In 1944, the Supreme Court overruled Grovey in Smith v. Allwright,
321 U.S. 649 (1944), finally recognizing that the Democratic Party's discrimina-
tion against black voters violated the Fifteenth Amendment's guarantee of the
right to vote to all races.
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to render the fifteenth amendment hollow by allowing the
dominant political party to exclude blacks from the only elec-
tion that mattered."'2 9
The Hughes Court had a mixed record in combatting other
types of bias against black voters. In Lane v. Wilson,1 30 the
Court struck down Oklahoma's patently discriminatory voter
registration statute, which essentially disenfranchised the
State's black citizens. However, this victory was muted by the
Court's prior decision in Breedlove v. Suttles,'31 which upheld a
poll tax, a device which disproportionately disenfranchised
black voters.132 It was not until the enactment of the Twenty-
fourth Amendment that this decision's effect on federal elec-
tions was reversed.
On balance, it must be acknowledged that the Supreme
Court under Hughes failed to vindicate blacks' constitutionally
guaranteed right to vote. Although the Court was willing to
strike down the most blatant forms of voter discrimination, it
lacked the will to address the South's increasingly sophisticated
means of denying blacks this most precious right of citizenship.
CONCLUSION
The poets and the writers of the 1920s and 1930s often con-
veyed the cruelties and the disparities that confronted blacks
more accurately and passionately than was possible in the dry,
distilled language of Supreme Court decisions. For example, in
129. David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: Civil Rights
and Liberties, 1930-1941, 1987 DUKE L.J. 800, 808 (footnote omitted).
130. 307 U.S. 268 (1939).
131. 302 U.S. 277 (1937), overruled by Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elec-
tions, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
132. In Breedlove, the Court upheld a poll tax of one dollar levied against
every Georgia inhabitant between the ages of 21 and 60, except blind and fe-
male residents who did not register to vote. Id. at 279-80. Georgians were not
allowed to vote in any elections unless this tax was paid. Id. at 280.
For a further discussion of the use of the poll tax to disenfranchise minor-
ity and lower income citizens, see 2 THOMAS I. EMERSON ET AL., POLITICAL
AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1120-34 (student ed. 1967); PRESI-
DENT'S COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, To SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE REPORT OF
THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS 38-39 (1947); Note, Disen-
franchisement by Means of the Poll Tax, 53 HARv. L. REV. 645, 645-52 (1940);
Note, Negro Disenfranchisement-A Challenge to the Constitution, 47 COLUM.
L. REV. 76, 92-94 (1947); see also Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 663, 668 (1966) (striking down a Virginia poll tax for state elections and
noting "[w]ealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane to one's ability to
participate intelligently in the electoral process"); United States v. Dogan, 314
F.2d 767, 768, 774 (5th Cir. 1963) (finding impermissible racial discrimination in
a county sheriff's refusal to accept poll taxes offered by black citizens).
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his moving introduction to the profound sociological study,
Black Metropolis,133 Richard Wright in 1945 gave voice to the
anger and frustration felt by many of the victims of racism in
America. Wright wrote:
What has America done to people who could sing out in limpid
verse to make them snarl about being "pressed to the wall" and deal-
ing "one death-blow"? Is this the result of a three-hundred-year pol-
icy of "knowing niggers and what's good for 'em"? Is this the
salvation which Christian missionaries have bought to the "heathen
from Africa"? That there is something wrong here only fools would
deny.134
He concluded:
White America has reduced Negro life in our great cities to a level of
experience of so crude and brutal a quality that one could say of it in
the words of Vachel Lindsay's The Leaden-Eyed that:
It is not that they starve, but they starve so dreamlessly,
It is not that they sow, but that they seldom reap,
It is not that they serve, but they have no gods to serve,
It is not that they die, but that they die like sheep.
135
Of course the Supreme Court did not and could not signifi-
canltly deter much of the despair and cruelty which Richard
Wright described. But nevertheless, in halting, tentative steps,
the Supreme Court in the 1930s began to turn away from Plessy
in a series of decisions that implicitly recognized that the sepa-
rate treatment afforded blacks in the nation's judicial, educa-
tional, and political systems was inherently, unmistakably
unequal and unfair.
During the Hughes Court era, civil rights lawyers began
the arduous task of removing some of the most treacherous
133. Richard Wright, Introduction to ST. CLAIRE DRAKE & HORACE R.
CAYTON, BLACK METROPOLIS: A STUDY OF NEGRO LIFE IN A NORTHERN CITY
(1945).
134. Id at xxxiv. Wright took the quoted words from "a new and strange
cry from another Negro, Claude McKay, [who] in his sonnet, If We Must Die,
... seems to snarl through a sob." Id. at xxxiii. McKay's sonnet goes:
If we must die-oh, let us nobly die,
So that our precious blood may not be shed
In vain; then even the monsters we defy
Shall be constrained to honor us though dead!
Oh, kinsmen! We must meet the common foe;
Though far outnumbered, let us still be brave,
And for their thousand blows deal one death-blow!
What though before us lies the open grave?
Like men we'll face the murderous, cowardly pack
Pressed to the wall, dying, but-fighting back!
Id. at xxxiv (quoting portions of McKay's sonnet as published in ANTHOLOGY




roadblocks on the "road to freedom."13 6 In the following de-
cades, other Supreme Court cases brought down still more bar-
riers to equality in the areas of public education and facilities,
employment, housing, criminal procedure, and voting rights.
While much has been accomplished, many roadblocks and
barriers nevertheless remain. The National Urban League's re-
cent assessment of Black America3 7 demonstrates that even to-
day for at least one-third of black Americans, the distance
between the goal of equality and the tragic daily reality of
discrimination is still devastating, as reflected in the data on
poverty, extraordinarily high unemployment rates, excessively
deteriorating housing, and disproportionate health
deficiencies. 1as
The incredible verdict in the recent trial of the officers ac-
cused of beating Rodney King 3 9 and the resulting explosion of
136. Speaking to the Association of the Bar of the City of New York on
April 21,1965, Martin Luther King said: "[Tihe road to freedom is now a high-
way because lawyers throughout the land, yesterday and today, have helped
clear the obstructions, have helped eliminate road blocks, by their selfless,
courageous espousal of difficult and unpopular causes." Martin Luther King,
Jr., The Civil Rights Struggle in the United States Today, 20 THE RECORD OF
THE ASs'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK No. 5, at 5, 6 (1965) (empha-
sis added).
137. NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE, INC., THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA: 1992
(Billy J. Tidwell ed., 1992) [hereinafter 1992 STATE OF BLACK AMERICA].
138. Tables and statistics in David H. Swinton, The Economic Status of Af-
rican Americans, in 1992 STATE OF BLACK AMERICA, supra note 137, at 60, 80,
report that 36.9% of blacks live in poverty. In 1990 the number of blacks in
poverty reached 9.8 million, up 500,000 over 1989. Id. at 89. Swinton also notes
the sharp drop in the 1980s of black rates of employment. Id. at 97-100. While
the overall rate of black unemployment for the past twenty years ranged be-
tween 10 and 12%, for black teenagers the unemployment rate has been over
30% since 1980. Id at 102.
Robert D. Bullard, Urban Infrastructure: Social, Environmental and
Health Risks to African Americans, in 1992 STATE OF BLACK AMERICA, supra
note 137, at 183, 183-88, examines black inner-city residents' exposure to infra-
structure decay, environmental degradation, health threats, and impoverish-
ment. The gravity of this situation is enormous since more than 57% of
African Americans live within the crumbling inner cities. The combination of
loan denial rates, residential segregation and racial discrimination severely re-
stricts the avenue of moving away from the deteriorating neighborhoods for
blacks in the inner city. Id at 184-86.
For a detailed examination of the persistent disparities between black and
white rates of illness, disability and death, see NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
A COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 391-450 (Gerald D.
Jaynes & Robin M. Williams, Jr. eds., 1989).
139. See Seth Mydans, The Police Verdict Los Angeles Policemen Acquit-
ted in Taped Beating, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1992, at Al; Seth Mydans, 23 Dead
After 2d Day of Los Angeles Riots; Fires and Looting Persist Despite Curfew,
N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1992, at Al; Robert Reinhold, Cleanup Begins in Los Ange-
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racial unrest in Los Angeles demonstrate that many blacks and
other non-whites believe that the system of justice is incapable
of protecting their basic rights. These tragic events illustrate
that the demise of de jure racial segregation was not equivalent
to the abolition of the massive racial and economic injustices
that still plague this country.
In assessing the current state of Black America, John E.
Jacob, president of the National Urban League, stated:
Even as we celebrated international triumphs, critical issues such
as the deepening recession, widespread poverty, mounting racial and
ethnic tensions, substandard schools, deteriorating cities and a crum-
bling infrastructure, restricted access to health care, and many others
were largely ignored by public policymakers.14 °
Many of the longstanding problems recounted in the Urban
League report cannot be addressed in any significant way by
the Supreme Court. But to the extent that some of these condi-
tions are within the ambit of issues that the Supreme Court can
adjudicate, one must wonder whether the current Supreme
Court will act to narrow the gaps. Two years ago, one of the
present authors wrote:
[W]e cannot become smug and assume that the trend of recent de-
cades toward eradicating racism will continue. It is obvious that the
most effective way to weaken the fabric of human and civil rights for
minorities would be to change the balance of the Supreme Court so
that gradually, in a slow but determined process, the Court would re-
pudiate its historic role in the protection of individual and minority
rights. The recent appraisal of the current Supreme Court by one of
its own members-Justice Thurgood Marshall said: "It is difficult to
characterize last terms' decisions [of the Supreme Court] as the prod-
uct of anything other than a deliberate retrenchment of the civil
rights agenda. ' 141
After those comments were written in 1990, both Justices
Brennan and Marshall resigned from the Court. One must
therefore ask whether the current Supreme Court will act in
our era as much as the Hughes Court acted in its time to re-
move some of the remaining barriers on the "road to free-
dom"142 that a moderate Supreme Court could eradicate.
les; Troops Enforce Surreal Calm, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1992, at Al; Richard W.
Stevenson, Toll is 38 in Los Angeles Riots But Violence Seems to Abate; Bush
Dispatches Force of 5,000, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1992, at Al.
140. John E. Jacob, Black America, 1991: An Overview, in 1992 STATE OF
BLACK AMERICA, supra note 137, at 1, 1.
141. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Racism in American and South African
Courts: Similarities and Differences, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 479, 587 (1990).
142. Three years ago, Justice Blackmun, speaking about a seemingly con-
sistent majority of five Supreme Court justices on key civil rights and race re-
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lations cases, observech "Sadly ... [o]ne wonders whether the majority [of
Supreme Court Justices] still believes that . .. race discrimination-or more
accurately, race discrimination against nonwhites-is a problem in our society,
or even remembers that it ever was." Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109
S. Ct. 2115, 2136 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). If there
is a retreat in the Supreme Court's traditional role in the protection of human
rights, such a demise becomes even more tragic because of other events that
are taking place in the United States. As Dr. Bernard C. Watson has so aptly
observed-
Ominous currents are swirling across the nation's landscape, and they
presage profound and disturbing questions about the future of these
United States. David Duke's recent emergence as a political force in
Louisiana represents only the most visible sign of widespread discon-
tent. Recent polls, focus groups, and annual surveys provide evidence
of deteriorating racial and ethnic relations in this country.
Bernard C. Watson, The Demographic Revolution: Diversity in the 21st Cen-
tury America, in NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE, INC., THE STATE OF BLACK
AMERICA: 1991, at 13, 13 (Billy J. Tidwell ed., 1991).
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